From Strategic Defeat to Theory of Victory

Introduction — A curious choice of words

At the Warsaw Security Forum, General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, presented what he called NATO's "Theory of Victory" in the event of a Russian attack against Alliance territory.

The formulation is intriguing.

Rather than referring to an established doctrine, the general spoke of a theory. Its operational logic is straightforward: Block the initial attack, Blunt the enemy's advance and, if necessary, Break the adversary's warfighting system.

The three stages appear to describe a coherent military approach. Forward-deployed forces would prevent territorial seizure; integrated surveillance, drones and precision capabilities would disrupt an advancing force; and, should the conflict continue, NATO would dismantle the operational system sustaining the attack.

The general also insisted that NATO was increasingly ready to implement this approach.

But one question deserves more attention than the announcement itself: What exactly is NATO preparing to win, and how has that conception of victory evolved since the beginning of the war in Ukraine?

A theory of victory is not a doctrine. Nor is it proof of operational readiness. It is an explanation of how military action is expected to produce a desired outcome.

To understand the significance of Grynkewich's declaration, we must first revisit the strategic language employed by Western leaders in the opening months of the Russian invasion.

1. The strategic defeat of Russia: an objective articulated in 2022

In March 2022, shortly after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, American officials began articulating an objective that went beyond supporting Ukraine's immediate defence.

On 10 March, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the Biden administration expected a strategic defeat of Putin and Russia, notwithstanding possible short-term tactical successes on the battlefield.

His formulation was significant. The objective was not merely to prevent Russia from conquering Ukraine. It was to ensure that the invasion produced a lasting strategic failure for Moscow.

The political dimension became more apparent in the following weeks.

On 15 March, Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland testified before Congress that the conflict would end when Putin recognised that his actions threatened his position within his military and among his own people. She added that he would have to change course or the Russian people would take matters into their own hands. She explicitly described the American endgame as the strategic defeat of Putin.

On 26 March, President Joe Biden, speaking in Warsaw, declared: "For God's sake, this man cannot remain in power."

The White House subsequently clarified that the statement did not represent a policy of regime change.

Nevertheless, the sequence of statements raised a fundamental question: Was the strategic objective limited to degrading Russia's ability to conduct another military intervention, or did it also encompass a transformation of the Russian political order?

The distinction is essential.

Strategic weakening, regime change and popular revolution are three different political outcomes. They may interact, but they cannot be treated as interchangeable objectives.

2. From military degradation to political transformation?

The reference to the Russian people taking matters into their own hands deserves particular attention.

It evokes a historical pattern familiar to European observers: political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, including the collapse of communist regimes and the subsequent political reorientation of former Soviet-aligned states.

The colour revolutions of the post-Soviet space also belong to this broader historical context, although their circumstances and political dynamics differed considerably.

It would be incorrect, however, to infer from Nuland's statement that Washington had adopted an operational plan to foment a Russian popular revolution.

No such publicly documented policy has been established.

The question is rather whether Western strategic thinking implicitly incorporated the expectation that sustained military, economic and diplomatic pressure would weaken the Russian state sufficiently to generate internal political consequences.

This possibility matters because it introduces a second dimension of victory.

A military defeat can restrict an adversary's capacity to use force. An economic defeat can reduce its ability to sustain military power. A political defeat can undermine the legitimacy or stability of its governing system.

These outcomes are related, but they require different mechanisms and different measures of success.

A strategy that seeks all three must explain how they reinforce one another and, crucially, how their interaction is expected to produce the desired political settlement.

3. The evolution of the objective: from strategic defeat to deterrence by denial

Grynkewich's formulation in Warsaw appears to introduce a different emphasis.

His three-stage model does not explicitly propose regime change, the political transformation of Russia or the destruction of the Russian state.

On the contrary, the general stated that NATO was not seeking to impose a strategic defeat on its adversary. Its objective was to prevent an attack from succeeding and deny Russia the ability to seize and hold Allied territory.

This is a significant distinction.

The operational objective is now presented in terms of deterrence by denial: making an attack incapable of achieving its intended territorial and military objectives.

The difference between these two formulations deserves examination.

In 2022, senior American officials spoke openly of strategic defeat, long-term weakening and the political consequences of Russia's invasion.

In the Warsaw declaration, the emphasis is on the capacity to block, blunt and, if necessary, break an attacking military system.

This does not necessarily represent a reversal of NATO's strategic posture. The two objectives can coexist.

But their relationship must be clarified.

Is the destruction of an invading force simply the means to deny territorial conquest? Or does the military architecture also support a broader strategy of permanently reducing Russian military power?

The answer determines how the three-stage theory should be understood.

4. A theory is not a doctrine — and readiness is not validation

The general's terminology raises a second, independent question.

A theory of victory describes the causal logic through which military action is expected to produce success. Doctrine establishes principles that guide military preparation and execution.

Operational plans translate those principles into concrete arrangements. Tactics determine how engagements are conducted.

These concepts are complementary, but they represent different levels of military thinking and execution.

The existence of a theory therefore does not establish that the corresponding military system is ready.

Consider the second stage, Blunt.

The proposed integration of sensors, artificial intelligence, drones and precision weapons assumes that information can be collected, processed, transmitted and converted into effective military action under hostile conditions.

But what happens when communications are disrupted? When sensors are destroyed? When the adversary adapts its electronic warfare? When the volume of information exceeds the capacity of command structures to process it?

The existence of individual capabilities does not demonstrate that the integrated system will function as intended.

Nor does the experience of Ukraine automatically validate NATO's proposed approach.

Ukraine's battlefield experience provides valuable lessons, but the conditions of a national war of survival are not identical to those of a multinational alliance confronting a nuclear-armed adversary.

Russia itself is also adapting.

A theory of victory must therefore account not only for its own capabilities but also for the adversary's capacity to learn, counter and disrupt the proposed mechanism.

Readiness must be assessed through more than investment announcements, force deployments and technological programmes. It requires evidence of integration, resilience, command effectiveness, logistical sustainability and realistic testing.

5. The unresolved relationship between military victory and political victory

Perhaps the most important question is not whether NATO can block, blunt and break a Russian military attack.

It is whether the military outcome can be translated into a stable political outcome.

Suppose the three stages succeed. Russian forces fail to seize NATO territory, their operational system is disrupted and the Alliance restores the territorial status quo.

What happens next?

Does Russia accept the military failure and return to a deterrence relationship with NATO?

Does the conflict escalate through other instruments, including cyber operations, economic pressure and political destabilisation?

Does the resulting military confrontation strengthen or weaken the political position of the Russian leadership?

And what political settlement does NATO ultimately consider acceptable?

These questions cannot be answered by military tactics alone.

They belong to strategy, where military operations must remain connected to political objectives.

The history of warfare offers repeated examples of tactical and operational success failing to produce the political outcome initially sought.

Winning battles is not necessarily winning wars. Destroying an adversary's military capability is not necessarily establishing a sustainable peace.

The distinction becomes even more important when both sides possess nuclear weapons.

Conclusion — What is the actual theory of victory?

General Grynkewich's declaration is an important statement about NATO's military preparations and its intended response to a possible Russian attack.

But the announcement should not be confused with proof that the proposed operational architecture has been fully validated.

More importantly, it invites a broader examination of the relationship between NATO's military preparations and the strategic objectives articulated by Western leaders since 2022.

The evolution from the language of strategic defeat to the language of deterrence by denial raises questions that deserve more than political declarations or military reassurance.

What constitutes victory? What level of military degradation is considered sufficient? Is the objective to deter Russia, defeat a Russian invasion, permanently constrain Russian military power, or influence the political future of the Russian state?

These are different objectives, requiring different theories of success.

A theory of victory becomes credible not because a commander declares it, but because its assumptions have survived rigorous testing against an adaptive adversary and because its military mechanisms remain connected to a clearly defined political objective.

NATO may have a theory of victory. The more consequential question is whether it has demonstrated the ability to turn that theory into a sustainable strategic outcome.